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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to be followed, a city council seems justified in similarly abridg-
ing speech and press in the exercise of its police power directed
toward the protection of its citizens and their property which it
has properly found to be endangered.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Jerome J. Shestack*
Over two hundred years ago Thomas Madox wrote that
the subject matter of corporated towns and communities is
extensive and difficult.' The years have not denied this observa-
tion. On the contrary, time has brought added complexity. The
available rules have simply not met the needs of an ever-
enlarging field.2 In the last term of the supreme court the local
government cases proved no exception. Although generally
reaching what appear to be sound results, the language of the
opinions often presents perplexities that should elicit no enthu-
siasm from those concerned with municipal law.
ELECTION OF ORDINANCES
The question of what form a proposition must take when
submitted to the electors of a municipality was raised in two
cases.
In Holt v. Vernon Parish School Board3 a proposition was
submitted to the voters of a school district ward to incur debt
and issue obligations "for the purpose of constructing and equip-
ping a gymnasium-auditorium, lunch room, and repairing present
school buildings" in the district. In State ex rel. Bussie v. Fant,4
relators attempted to force the city council to submit to the elec-
tors of the city an ordinance raising the salaries of fire depart-
ment employees ten cents an hour and police department
employees fifteen cents an hour.
In each case it was contended that the proposition in ques-
tion was illegal in that it contained more than one proposition
without affording the electors an opportunity to vote on each one
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Thomas Madox, Historical Essay Concerning. the Cities, Towns and
Buroughs of England, taken from Records (1726) quoted in Dillon, Municipal
Corporations, preface (5 ed. 1911) and in Harris, Municipal Corporations, 5
Rutgers L. Rev. 76 (1950).
2. A malady not localized of course to local government law.
3. 217 La. 1, 45 So. 2d 745 (1950).
4. 216 La. 58, 43 So. 2d 217 (1949).
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separately. The contention was rejected in the School Board
case and accepted in the Fant5 case.
In both decisions the court stated the rule that separate
objects cannot be submitted to the electors in one proposition.
This is clearly so in the School Board case inasmuch as the stat-
ute under which the election was called so provides.6 The rule
is questionable, however, when applied to the Fant case. There
the statute did not require that each ordinance contain a separate
proposition. What then is the basis for the court imposing such
a rule?7 Most of the courts stating the rule cite the policy behind
it, namely, to prevent "log-rolling" and to allow the voter to
express freely his choice." Granted that the policy is a good one
and the rule desirable, it is nevertheless doubtful whether it is
within the province of the court to impose such a rule in the
absence of a statutory or constitutional" basis. And yet in most
states the courts have blithely done so"° without citing, seeking,
or having any such basis." It is perhaps hard to take issue with
a court for following a rule so clearly desirable; nevertheless it
should be recognized that this is judicial law making in what is
normally and properly a legislative area.
Accepting the rule of separability as established, the next
question is what test should be used in determining whether a
proposition has more than one object. The test set forth by the
supreme court in both cases is "whether or not there exists a
natural relation between the structures or objects to be united
5. Since the court held the ordinance illegal in the Fant case, mandamus
to compel the submission of the ordinance to the electors was refused. See
discussion, infra p. 208.
6. La. Act 46 of 1921 (E.S.) § 16, as amended by La. Act 282 of 1938 and
La. Act 6 of 1938 (E.S.) (La. R.S. [1950] 39:508 et seq.).
7. The only Louisiana authority cited by the Fant case for the rule was
Tolson v. Police Jury of St. Tammany Parish, 119 La. 215, 43 So. 1011 (1907).
But this is doubtful authority since it involved a taxing proposal covered by
statute and Constitution. For a suggestion that a double purpose may be
permitted in an ordinance, see Gray v. Bourgeois, 107 La. 671, 682, 32 So. 42,
47 (1902).
8. See, e.g., Re Validation Bonds, 170 Miss. 886, 156 So. 516 (1934); Rea v.
LaFayette, 130 Ga. 771, 61 S.E. 707 (1908).
' 9. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16, requiring that each statute shall
embrace but one object does not apply to municipal ordinances. City of New
Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); Town of St. Martin-
ville v. Dugas, 158 La. 262, 103 So. 761 (1925).
10. See list of authorities by states in 4 A.L.R. 2d 617, 623-625 (1947).
11. It has been suggested that the rule has some sort of unannounced due
process foundation. If so, why does it not prevent log-rolling in Congress and
in state legislatures which are not limited by a provision such as Article III,
Section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution? Does due process require separate
propositions for the voters and not for the legislators? What is it that the
voter is being deprived of without due process? Life? Liberty? Property?
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in one proposition." 2 Under this test, of course, "a large dis-
cretion is vested in the courts.'u 3 Thus in the School Board case
the supreme court found a natural relationship between con-
structing a school gymnasium-auditorium, constructing a lunch-
room and repairing various school buildings, whereas in the
Fant case it was unable to find a natural relationship between
raising the wages of city policemen and city firemen. Obviously
this kind of test will force the attorney seeking to advise council
or client to spin a coin or read the biographies of the justices to
learn their personal predilections. A recognition of the test's
shortcomings does not, however, mean that a more desirable test
can be formulated. The writer, at any rate, is unwilling to ven-
ture one.1 4 It may nevertheless be suggested that this field is
one in which the legislative bodies should act and a court should
exercise restraint in using the test to void legislative ordinances
or proposals.
The Fant case is also interesting in relation to the question
of whether a court will decide the legality of an ordinance before
it has been elected by the voters. In the Fant decision the court
was willing to pass on the ordinance in advance of the election,
and having decided on its illegality, refused to grant mandamus
to compel submission of the ordinance to the voters.
The converse of this was before.the court only a month later
in Bardwell v. Parish Council of East Baton Rouge.15 Here,
certain parish residents sought to enjoin an election on various
amendments to the East Baton Rouge plan of government on the
ground that the amendments were illegal. This time the court
refused to pass on the legality of the amendments and dismissed
the suit on the ground that the threatened injury was not
irreparable but remote, and was therefore premature.
Thus in the Fant case the taxpayer is saved an election that
may turn out useless; in the Bardwell case, he is not. The Fant
decision accrues to the taxpayer's benefit; the Bardwell one does
not."'6 The court appears to have been led to this difference in
12. 217 La. 1, 45 So. 2d 745, 746 (1950).
13. Ibid..
14. Among the tests that have been used are identity of purpose, com-
prehensive purpose, unity of object, and so on. See 4 A.L.R. 2d 617, 630-632
(1947). All of these are vague and do not materially assist in an attempt to
predict the decision of a court in an individual case.
15. 216 La. 537, 44 So. 2d 107 (1942).
16. For divers reasons various citizens opposed to the incumbent form of
government have been known to submit ordinances to the council that are
clearly illegal. The council may believe it expeditious to place the matter
before the voters rather than reject the proposals on council responsibility.
If the proposals are defeated, the council can claim, so to speak, a vote of
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results because of the different procedures involved.'7 Where
mandamus was brought the court was willing to examine the
legality of the proposed ordinance. But where injunction was
sought the court required a direct and irreparable injury before
it passed on the proposal.18
Accepting this distinction between the two remedies, the
court in the Bardwell case might nevertheless have reached the
sounder result of the Fant decision. The ground for dismissal in
the Bardwell opinion was that the suit was premature because
the injury was remote. Yet elections are costly affairs and their
cost must be borne by the taxpayer. The pro rata injury to each
taxpayer may be small, but it is hardly remote. Had this been
acknowledged, the court could have recognized the distinction
between mandamus and injunction and still have decided the
legality of the proposals before they were submitted to an
expensive election, likely to prove a fruitless one.19
ANNEXATION
In Barbe v. City of Lake Charles,'0 plaintiffs challenged an
ordinance of Lake Charles providing for the enlargement of the
corporate limits of the city under the provisions of Act 315 of
1946. 21 After the ordinance of annexation had been adopted on
confidence. If the proposals are elected, court action is undertaken and the
responsibility of vetoing the people's choice shifts to the court. Such maneu-
vering may reveal political acumen, but it hardly shows consideration for
the taxpayer's purse. Common sense would dictate that the legality of the
proposals be decided before the election was held.
17. The Bardwell opinion's only reference to the Fant case was as fol-
lows: "Conversely, it is to be noted that a different rule has been recognized
by some courts, including this one, in cases where a municipal council has
refused to submit the initiative or referendum measure to the people and
electors have sought to mandamus the body to compel a compliance with its
ministerial duty. In such instances, it has been held that the writ will be
denied if it is shown that the ordinance if adopted would be illegal or uncon-
stitutional." Although not very explicit, the court is apparently attempting
to draw attention to the procedural differences in the two cases.
A possible reconciliation between the decisions is that in each the court
adopted a hands-off policy in municipal affairs. Although this objective has
much to be said in its behalf, it was not enunciated in the opinion.
18. It seems generally accepted that irreparable injury need not be
shown for mandamus to lie, since it is essentially a legal writ, whereas such
injury must be shown in the case of an injunction which is an equitable
remedy. See McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed. 1950) §§ 49.51, 51.49.
As an original question, one might wonder why the two remedies should lead
to opposite results under similar circumstances. For a suggestion that both
remedies should be governed by common principles, see McQuillin, supra,
at § 51.04.
19. The advisory opinion aspects of deciding the legality in advance
should prove no obstacle. The proponents of the proposals are certainly bona
fide party litigants. See Bardwell v. Parish Council of Parish of East Baton
Rouge, 216 La. 537, 543, 44 So. 2d 107, 109 (1949).
20. 216 La. 871, 45 So. 2d 62 (1950).
21. La. R.S. (1950) 33:171-179.
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second reading, a number of the signers of the annexation peti-
tion sought to withdraw their names from the original petition.
There was no evidence that the signatures sought to be with-
drawn had been obtained fraudulently or in bad faith, and the
city council did not allow the withdrawals. Plaintiff-appellant
urged that the right to withdraw signatures from an annexation
petition terminates only after the adoption of the ordinance on
third reading.22
The court held that the right of withdrawal was limited to
the time when jurisdiction over the subject matter attached.23
In this case, said the court, the city council became vested with
jurisdiction after proper presentation of the petition, publication,
and holding of a hearing as required under the statute.
In arriving at a decision the court had to consider two con-
flicting interests. On the one hand was regard for the individual
right of the petitioner; on the other was regard for a workable
process of annexation. The proverbial line had to be drawn
between these two interests and since the statute was silent on
the question, the court obviously had to do the drawing. The
point chosen seems reasonable and considerate of both interests.
It seems hardly desirable, however, for the court to have spoken
in terms of jurisdiction attaching. Such language merely ob-
scures. The "jurisdiction" of the council could just as logically
have been said to attach at the point where the petition was pre-
sented to the council, 24 at the point where the council granted a
hearing,25 or at any number of other points along the way. To
speak of jurisdiction in this type of situation is simply not very
meaningful. What was desired is a practical point at which to
limit withdrawal and this was chosen. There should be no need
to masquerade a common sense choice in a jurisdictional jargon.
Justices Fournet and Ponder in a dissent point out that the
"legislature in clear and unambiguous language sets out the pro-
cedure" 26 for annexing territory and that this procedure must
be followed. To this amen. But the dissent then proceeds to read
22. Plaintiffs sought to overturn the annexation on a number of grounds.
The contention concerning the withdrawal of signatures was the chief one
discussed -by the court. On rehearing the court restricted itself to this
question.-
23. -The rules in other states are not in harmony. See In Annotation, 126
A.L.R. 1031 (1939); McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 7.33.
24. Hawkins v. Carroll, 190 S.C. 11, 1 S.E. 2d 898 (1939); Seibert v. Lovell,
92 Iowa 507, 61 N.W. 197 (1894).
25. Cf. Miller v. Maier, 136 Minn. 231, 161 N.W. 513 (1917). See Annota-
tion 126 A.L.R. 1031, 1057-1061 (1939).
26. 216 La. 871, 898, 45 So. 2d 62, 71 (1950).
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into the statute the requirement that a petitioner must be allowed
to withdraw until the third and final reading. Nowhere in the
language of the statute is this requirement to be found. Nor is it
probable that the legislature intended any such requirement, so
likely to bog down annexation procedure. 27
NEW ORLEANS
In 1948 the legislature enacted a statute changing the New
Orleans form of government in a number of respects. 28 The
major changes were (1) the number of elected public officials
increased from a mayor and four councilmen to a mayor and
seven councilmen; (2) each councilman to be elected by the
electors of one of the city's municipal districts instead of from
the city at large; and (3) the number of city departments in-
creased from five to eight, to correspond to the number of elected
officials, who, as before, are each to head a department.
Shortly after this act went into effect, the City of New
Orleans instituted proceedings to have the act declared unconsti-
tutional and to enjoin the Board of Supervisors of Elections from
holding an election for mayor and councilmen under the act. 29
Two arguments were chiefly relied upon by the city to sup-
port their argument of unconstitutionality.
The first was based upon the so-called "home rule" clause
of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides: "The electors of
the City of New Orleans ... shall have the right to choose their
public officers."3 0 It was contended that Act 234, by providing
for the election of the commissioners from districts, instead of
from the city as a whole, denied the electors the right to choose
their officers. After an extensive review of the past forms of
government enjoyed by New Orleans the court concluded that
the "home rule" provision shows that:
".... the drafters of the constitution simply intended the offi-
cers controlling the ordinary governmental functions of the
27. As the majority pointed out: "To hold otherwise we would, in effect,
be saying that the opponents of a proposed annexation under the provisions
of the act . . . after the governing authorities of such municipality have
acted upon the petition, could by merely inducing the signers of the petition
for annexation to withdraw their signatures from the original petition,
necessitate that the proponents of annexation seek additional signatures
and to institute the entire proceedings anew . . . Such a holding would
unreasonably hinder and interfere with the procedure for annexation." 216
La. 871, 893-894, 45 So. 2d 62, 69 (1950).
28. La. Act 234 of 1948.
29. City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for the
Parish of Orleans, 216 La. 116, 43 So. 2d 237 (1949).
30. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 22.
1951]
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City of New Orleans . . . should be chosen or elected by the
electors of the city rather than be appointed by the governor
or entitled to hold office in some other manner that might
be prescribed by the legislature under its plenary powers." 1
This history of New Orleans government clearly indicates
the correctness of the court's conclusion.8 2 The constitution
insures only against legislative interference in the election of
officials. It was not intended to interfere with legislative control
over the system of government of New Orleans, nor to prohibit
the legislature from designating the number of offices or the
manner by which they were to be filled.
The second argument for the unconstitutionality of the
statute was based upon Section 16, Article 3, of the Louisiana
Constitution, which provides, "Every statute enacted by the
Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title
indicative of its object." The city contended and the trial court
agreed that the above section was violated by Act 234 because
the act purported to amend and reenact Act 159 of 1912, pro-
viding for a commission form of government, whereas the body
of the act actually established an aldermanic form.88
Upon appeal, the supreme court reversed. The court under-
took a detailed analysis of the difference between the commis-
sion and the aldermanic forms of government. The distinctive
feature of the commission form, stated the court, was the dele-
gation of both executive and legislative powers to a single board
consisting of a mayor and a limited number of other officials;
the basic characteristic of the aldermanic form is the placing of
executive powers in the hands of an executive officer and the
legislative power in a separate body, commonly called a council
or board of aldermen. Inasmuch as the amending act did not
place the legislative and executive powers in separate bodies, the
court concluded that the act did not substitute an aldermanic
organization for a commission form. In addition, said the court;
the form of government previously established by the act of 1912
31. City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for the-
Parish of Orleans, 216 La. 116, 132, 43 So. 2d 237, 242 (1949).
32. 216 La. 116, 127-132, 43 So. 2d 237, 241-242 (1949).
33. La. Act 234 of 1948 was entitled: "An act to amend and. reenact ...
[certain sections] of Act 159 of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana for
the year 1912 (as amended by Act 338 of 1938) entitled: 'An act to incorpo-
rate the City of New Orleans; to provide a commission form of government
for the administration of the affairs of the city .. " (Italics supplied.)
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was in itself a hybrid rather than a true commission form 34 and
the recent amendments merely continued the hybrid nature.
The combination of executive and legislative functions may
indeed be a characteristic feature of the commission form of
government, but the election of councilmen from districts is no
less characteristic of the aldermanic method.35 And if the act of
1912 already placed the commission form into a Humpty-Dumpty
like position, the act of 1948 seems to have given Humpty-Dumpty
so healthy a shove that even legal analysis is hard put to piece
him together again.
But all this concern over affixing a label to the New Orleans
form of government is beside the point. The purpose of the
Article III, Section 16, as applied to this case is simply to prevent
deception and surprise in legislation.36 Thus the problem before
the court was whether the particular title was deceptive in view
of the changes wrought by Act 234. If we approach this question
from the point of view of a person totally unacquainted with
Louisiana affairs, there can be little doubt that such a reader
would be misled by the title. However, this approach to Section
16 of Article III would be to introduce an objectivity reductio ad
absurdum. Realistically speaking, the title of the act did not at
all deceive Louisianians as to the intention of the legisalture with
regard to New Orleans.8 7 Whatever else was contravened, the
reasons behind Article III, Section 16, were not,38 and the court,
although taking a circuitous route, was correct in rejecting this
section as a ground for the unconstitutionality of Act 234.
34. This is because, under Act 159 of 1912, a portion of the municipal
powers were exercised by boards, commissions and ex-officio bodies instead
of by the city commissioners.
35. See Anderson and Weidner, American City Government (rev. ed. 1950)
367-371, 403.
36. "Its object is to prevent the practice, common in all legislative bodies
where no such provision exists of embracing in the same bill incongruous
matters, having no relation to each other, or to the subject specified in the
title, by which measures are often adopted without attracting attention,
which, if noticed, would have been resisted and defeated. It thus serves to
prevent surprise in legislation." State of Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278,
289 (1881). The court quoted this section, but then went on to compare alder-
manic with commission forms of government.
37. Perhaps this introduces a subjective standard. But surely the court
should be able to take judicial notice of the wide publicity connected with
the passage of this act. And if a subjective standard is introduced, would it
be so undesirable in this case?
38. See note 36. An excellent discussion of the subject appears in Allo-
pathic State Board of Medical Examiners v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 1367-
1368, 24 So. 809, 812-813 (1898).
1951]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS
In Smith v. Town of Vinton,39 plaintiff sought recovery for
work performed in repairing defendant's electrical system, pur-
suant to a verbal contract with the mayor. The court noted that
under the contract the making of repairs was merely incidental
to the principal undertaking of rebuilding the defendant's elec-
trical system at a cost of approximately $25,000. This being so,
the contract was void as a violation of the statute requiring
advertising and competitive bidding where the amount of the
public work exceeds $500. However, said the court, since the
transaction was malum prohibitum, not malum in se and since
no fraud was involved and the city received the benefits, plain-
tiff could recover for the actual cost of the materials under the
unjust enrichment theory of the civil law.
Strictly speaking, in allowing recovery for the actual cost of
the materials to the vendor, the court departed somewhat from
the unjust enrichment theory of the civil law. For in the civil
law, the amount recoverable under this theory "must not exceed
the enrichment of the defendant or the impoverishment of the
plaintiff," whichever is smaller.40 Very often, of course, the two
measures of damages produce the same result. Nevertheless,
language loosely interchanging the two measures may lead to an
erroneous choice in a case where a difference does exist.41
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
State excises and local property taxes occupied the attention
of the court in four cases decided during the course of the term,
three of which involved constitutional issues of significance, state
or federal or both, but the result in none of them affects the
over-all tax structure of the taxing authorities involved.
Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company v. Guilbeau' was an
action in which the plaintiff, seeking to recover levee district
39. 216 La. 9, 43 So. 2d 18 (1949).
40. David, Unjustified Enrichment in French Law, 5 Camb. L.J. 205, 222
(1934); Rinfret, The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment in the Law of
Quebec, 15 Can. Bar Rev. 331 (1937).
41. The court also cited Article 1965 of the Revised Civil Code in support
of its decision. Although this article as interpreted would seem to support
the instant case, it should be noted that the interpretations of this article
vary in several respects from the unjust enrichment theory of the civil law.
See note 40, supra.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 La. 160, 46 So. 2d 113 1950).
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